CRITICALITY SAFETY OF PROCESSING SALT SOLUTION AT SRS by Stephens, K et al.
 
This document was prepared in conjunction with work accomplished under 
Contract No. DE-AC09-96SR18500 with the U.S. Department of Energy. 
 
 
 
This work was prepared under an agreement with and funded by the U.S. Government. 
Neither the U. S. Government or its employees, nor any of its contractors, subcontractors 
or their employees, makes any express or implied:  1. warranty or assumes any legal 
liability for the accuracy, completeness, or for the use or results of such use of any 
information, product, or process disclosed; or  2. representation that such use or results 
of such use would not infringe privately owned rights; or  3. endorsement or 
recommendation of any specifically identified commercial product, process, or service. 
Any views and opinions of authors expressed in this work do not necessarily state 
or reflect those of the United States Government, or its contractors, or subcontractors. 
  
Criticality Safety of Processing Salt Solution at SRS 
 
Davoud A. Eghbali and L. Michelle Abney 
Washington Safety Management Solutions, LLC 
2131 South Centennial Ave. S.E., Aiken, SC 29808 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
High level radioactive liquid waste generated as a 
result of the production of nuclear material for the United 
States defense program at the Savannah River Site has 
been stored as 36 million gallons in underground tanks. 
About ten percent of the waste volume is sludge, 
composed of insoluble metal hydroxides primarily 
hydroxides of Mn, Fe, Al, Hg, and most radionuclides 
including fission products.  The remaining ninety percent 
of the waste volume is saltcake, composed of primarily 
sodium (nitrites, nitrates, and aluminates) and hydroxides. 
Saltcakes account for 30% of the radioactivity while the 
sludge accounts for 70% of the radioactivity. 
 
A pilot plant salt disposition processing system has 
been designed at the Savannah River Site for interim 
processing of salt solution and is composed of two 
facilities: the Actinide Removal Process Facility (ARPF) 
and the Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit 
(MCU).  Data from the pilot plant salt processing system 
will be used for future processing salt at a much higher 
rate in a new salt processing facility. 
 
Saltcake contains significant amounts of actinides, 
and other long-lived radioactive nuclides such as 
strontium and cesium that must be extracted prior to 
disposal as low level waste.  The extracted radioactive 
nuclides will be mixed with the sludge from waste tanks 
and vitrified in another facility.  Because of the presence 
of highly enriched uranium in the saltcake, there is a 
criticality concern associated with concentration and/or 
accumulation of fissionable material in the ARP and 
MCU. 
 
DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
Once the sludge is settled in the waste tanks, a layer 
composed of water and dissolved salts, commonly named 
“supernate” collects above the sludge layer. To reduce the 
volume and the chances of escaping to the environment in 
the event of a tank leak, the supernate in the storage tanks 
were decanted and concentrated in the evaporators.  The 
concentrated supernate crystallized to form the saltcake 
when returned to storage tanks.  Saltcake is composed of 
salt crystals, interstitial liquid, gas, and insoluble solids, 
including uranium and plutonium. 
 
Saltcakes will be dissolved using inhibited (0.02 M 
NaOH) water and the solution sodium ion concentration 
will be adjusted to around 5 M prior to processing. The 
dissolved saltcake solution contains some insoluble 
compounds, including fissionable material. These 
compounds were formed in the evaporators during 
concentration process and are essentially insoluble in 
water. The solubility of uranium and plutonium in the 
dissolved saltcake solution is 25 mg/L and 1.68 mg/L, 
respectively [1]. 
 
ARPF uses two 6000-gallon tanks to strike the salt 
solution with monosodium titanate (MST) at a 
concentration of 0.4 – 0.6 g/L.  MST (NaHTi2O5) adsorbs 
soluble actinides and strontium in the salt solution.  The 
resultant slurry is agitated for approximately 24 hours 
before it is transferred to a 6000-gallon concentration 
tank. The MST/solids slurry from processing several salt 
solution batches will be accumulated and concentrated to 
approximately 5 weight percent solids by circulating the 
salt solution with MST/solids through a crossflow filter.  
The concentrated MST/solids will be mixed with the 
sludge from waste tanks to be vitrified in another facility. 
The filtrate, containing cesium and a small amount of 
uranium and plutonium, will be transferred to MCU for 
cesium removal. 
 
MCU, as shown in Figure 1, uses a solvent extraction 
process to remove cesium from the filtrate. The stream 
with the cesium is mixed with the MST/solids/sludge 
stream from ARPF. The decontaminated salt solution with 
a trace amount of radionuclides is routed for disposal as 
low level waste. 
 
In MCU, an organic solvent called “calixarene” is 
contacted with the salt solution stream in a series of seven 
countercurrent centrifugal contactors.  This results in the 
extraction of cesium and nitrate ions into the solvent 
phase. The cesium is held by calixarene molecules while 
the modifier molecules stabilize the nitrate ions.  
Downstream from the contactors, the resulting 
decontaminated salt solution which is the raffinate from 
the extraction process is decanted to remove entrained 
organics. After organic removal, the decontaminated salt 
solution is routed for disposal as a low level waste. 
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Fig. 1.  MCU Process Flow Diagram 
 
The organic stream from the extraction contactors is 
routed to a pair of scrub contactors where a dilute nitric 
acid stream scrubs salts other than cesium salts from the 
organic stream.  The organic stream then flows to another 
bank of seven centrifugal contractors where a stream of 
very weak nitric acid strips the cesium from the organic 
stream.  The organic stream then flows to a pair of caustic 
wash contactors that remove contaminants from the 
organic, then to a solvent hold tank.  The aqueous strip 
solution is decanted to remove entrained organics, and 
transferred to the verification facility. 
 
Uranium and plutonium loading onto MST has been 
determined to be 14 and 2.79 weight percent, 
respectively, after nearly two weeks of contact time [2]. 
The maximum uranium enrichment in the saltcakes to be 
proceed is 66 weight percent. 
 
In ARPF, because of the presence of highly enriched 
uranium in the salt solution, concentration of MST/solids 
slurry in the concentration tank or in the crossflow filter 
pose a criticality concern. In MCU facility, there is a 
potential for accumulation of fissionable material in the 
extraction columns or accumulation of fissionable 
material in the decanter or in the decontaminated salt 
solution hold tank, due to the potential change in the salt 
solution pH caused by the nitric acid used in the scrub 
contactors [3]. 
 
The Department of Energy has approved interim 
processing of salt solution in the pilot plant ARP/MCU 
facility provided no more than a single subcritical 
fissionable material can be allowed to be within the 
boundary of the ARP/MCU at a time.  Data from the pilot 
plant facility will be used to process salt solution at a 
much higher rate in a new salt processing facility. 
 
Restricting the fissionable material mass within the 
ARP/MCU boundary to a single subcritical mass limit or 
downblending the uranium in the saltcakes to less than the 
subcritical uranium enrichment of 0.93 weight percent [4] 
is a cost prohibitive option to process the saltcake without 
a criticality safety concern. 
 
An alternative option is to take credit for the presence 
of titanium in MST in the concentration tank and the 
crossflow filter.  Titanium is a weak neutron absorber 
with a thermal absorption cross section of 6.1 barns.  
Scoping calculations have demonstrated that accounting 
for the presence of titanium in the MST laden with 
fissionable material, saltcakes with uranium enrichments 
of up to 10 weight percent can safely be processed.  Due 
to the lack of any benchmark experiments involving 
titanium, an additional safety margin of 3 % was included 
in determining the ksafe for the scoping calculations. 
 
Efforts are underway for evaluation of titanium cross 
sections. Using the obtained data for validation of 
titanium cross sections could allow for elimination of the 
additional safety margin, thereby increasing the maximum 
uranium enrichment that can be safely processed in the 
actinide removal processing section of the new salt 
processing facility. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Use of the validated cross section data for titanium 
combined with the data obtained from the pilot plant salt 
processing system will be used to maximize the uranium 
enrichment in the saltcake that can be safely processed in 
the new salt processing facility. 
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